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Abstract
Dodis et al. proposed an improved version of the fuzzy vault scheme,
one of the most popular primitives used in biometric cryptosystems,
requiring less storage and leaking less information. Recently, Blan-
ton and Aliasgari have shown that the relation of two improved fuzzy
vault records of the same individual may be determined by solving a
system of non-linear equations. However, they conjectured that this
is feasible for small parameters only. In this paper, we present a new
attack against the improved fuzzy vault scheme based on the extended
Euclidean algorithm that determines if two records are related and re-
covers the elements by which the protected features, e.g., the biometric
templates, differ. Our theoretical and empirical analysis demonstrates
that the attack is very effective and efficient for practical parameters.
Furthermore, we show how this attack can be extended to fully recover
both feature sets from related vault records much more efficiently than
possible by attacking each record individually. We complement this
work by deriving lower bounds for record multiplicity attacks and use
these to show that our attack is asymptotically optimal in an infor-
mation theoretic sense. Finally, we propose remedies to harden the
scheme against record multiplicity attacks.
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1 Introduction
The fuzzy vault scheme by Juels and Sudan [1,2] is a cryptographic primitive
for error-tolerant authentication based on unordered feature sets without
revealing the features. It is considered as a potential tool for implementing
biometric cryptosystems that allow authentication and key derivation based
on protected biometric features, e.g., extracted from a human’s fingerprints
[3–7], irises [8], and even face [9]. Roughly speaking, it works by hiding the
set of genuine features in a randomly generated set of chaff features, and its
security is based on the hardness of the polynomial reconstruction problem
(see [10]).
However, a serious problem is its vulnerability to record multiplicity at-
tacks that link multiple vault records protecting features of the same bio-
metric instance, e.g., the same finger and uncover the protected biometric
data [11,12]: Via correlation, related vault records may be recognized across
different databases which conflicts with the unlinkability requirement for
biometric information protection [13]; even worse, given records of overlap-
ping feature sets, the common features can be easily recovered, violating the
irreversibility requirement.
If the individual feature elements can be robustly represented,1 e.g., by
using sufficiently accurate measurements or applying quantization, correla-
tion attacks can be thwarted by filling up the entire space with chaff points.
Unfortunately, this countermeasure drastically inflates the vault records.
An alternative is provided by the improved fuzzy vault scheme proposed by
Dodis et al. [14,15] in which the chaff features are replaced by a polynomial.
As a consequence, the data size of the vault records are significantly smaller
as compared to those in the original fuzzy vault scheme. Furthermore, since
the polynomial represents a maximal number of chaff features, the infor-
mation leakage becomes minimal and the correlation attacks against the
original fuzzy vault do not apply.
In 2013, Blanton and Aliasgari [16] showed that the improved fuzzy vault
scheme is, in principle, also susceptible to record multiplicity attacks, be-
cause two vault records of overlapping feature sets leak the elements by
which the sets differ. They argued that, for larger feature sets, determin-
ing the leaked features may be computationally impossible — a conjecture
disproved by our attacks.
1.1 Related Work
There are other schemes that are considered to implement biometric protec-
tion. A popular example is the fuzzy commitment scheme, which has been
1A nice property of the fuzzy vault scheme is the possibility to tolerate noise not only
on the set level but also in the representations of the individual elements, e.g., introduced
by measurement errors.
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proposed in 1999 by Juels and Wattenberg [17]. More general concepts,
called secure sketches or fuzzy sketches, have been introduced by Dodis et
al. in 2004 [14]. Given multiple instances of a certain fuzzy sketch protecting
templates of the same individual, one may ask whether their correspondence
can be examined, i.e., cross-matching.
In 2009, Simoens et al. [18] introduced cross-matching attacks as well as
attacks via record multiplicity (called distinguishability attack and reversibil-
ity attack, respectively, in that paper); they observed that, for example, the
fuzzy commitment scheme may be vulnerable to such kinds of attacks. In
2011, Kelkboom et al. [19] showed how cross-matching performance in a
fuzzy commitment scheme is related to the system’s authentication perfor-
mance; furthermore, they proposed to apply (public) random permutation
processes to prevent the attacks presented in [18]. Similar ideas have already
been briefly noted by Bringer et al. in 2008 [20] where the use of cancelable
biometrics was considered to potentially prevent cross-matching attacks.
In 2012, Blanton and Aliasgari [21] considered other known fuzzy sketch
constructions and concluded that they may be vulnerable to cross-matching
and attacks via record multiplicity as well; they also proposed the use of
a (secret) key in order to mitigate these vulnerabilities. More details on
the approaches of these attacks against fuzzy sketches can be found in [16].
Blanton and Aliasgari’s considerations [16] also comprise attacks against the
improved fuzzy vault scheme. In particular, they observed that, if two in-
stances of the improved fuzzy vault scheme protect sufficiently overlapping
feature sets, their set differences, i.e., the differing elements, can, in princi-
ple, be reconstructed by solving a system of non-linear equations. However,
the authors admit that their proposed method is computationally feasible
only when the number of differing elements is small, which implies that it
may not be applicable for practically relevant parameters.
1.2 Contribution and Outline of the Paper
In Section 3, we show that an efficient (i.e., random polynomial-time) record
multiplicity attack against the improved fuzzy vault scheme exists. Based
on the extended Euclidean algorithm, the attack can reliably determine if
two vault records are related, i.e., if they belong to the same individual,
and can partially uncover the features, e.g., the biometric data. Specifically,
if the feature sets protected by the vault records sufficiently overlap, the
attack can recover the feature elements in which these sets differ. Thus,
this partial recovery attack solves the equations established by Blanton and
Aliasgari [16] efficiently even for large parameters. Thereby, we cannot only
determine the differing elements from the feature sets but also distinguish
related from non-related vault correspondences. We can prove that the
attack is always successful provided that the overlap between the feature
sets is within the limits determined by Blanton and Aliasgari. In particular,
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the attack can successfully link two records of the same user with high
probability and uncover the feature elements in which the feature sets differ.
We perform some experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack.
Finally, we show how our partial recovery attack can be extended to a full
recovery attack that can completely uncover the feature sets with much
higher probability than possible with only one record; thereby, we analyze in
which cases the recovery is efficiently possible or even becomes deterministic.
In Section 4 we extend the results of [14] and derive an upper bound for
the information leakage of related vault records. We use this result to derive
bounds for the success probability of attacks that aim at determining the
feature sets (full recovery) or individual elements thereof (partial recovery)
from vault records of two overlapping feature sets. Based on these bounds,
we can show that our partial recovery attack is optimal with respect to
the number of elements extracted, and that our full recovery attack is, for
increasing field size, asymptotically optimal. We are also able to show the
impossibility to extract elements from the feature sets’ overlap with non-
negligible probability for sufficiently large finite fields; as a side-product,
this also implies that, for sufficiently large finite fields, no attack can extract
feature elements from a single vault record.
In Section 5, we discuss countermeasures that may prevent successful
application of record multiplicity attacks in a possible system incorporating
the fuzzy vault scheme. Final discussions are drawn in Section 6.
Before we start with describing our attack, we first describe the func-
tioning and some details on fuzzy vault schemes, original and improved, and
examine the differences between them.
2 The Fuzzy Vault Schemes
2.1 The Original Fuzzy Vault Scheme
In the fuzzy vault vault scheme by Juels and Sudan [2], it is assumed that
the features measured from an individual are encoded as a feature set A of
size t with elements in a fixed finite field F of size n = |F|.
On enrollment, first, a random secret polynomial f ∈ F[X] of degree
< k is generated; then, the secret polynomial is evaluated on the feature set
to build the set of genuine pairs G ⊂ F × F containing the pairs (x, f(x))
where x ∈ A; note that, if k ≤ t, thenG uniquely encodes f and the features
A; to hide both f and A, a large set C of random chaff pairs (x, y) where
x /∈ A and y 6= f(x) is generated; finally, the union V = G ∪ C of size r
builds the vault.
On authentication, a second query feature set B of the allegedly genuine
individual is provided; it is used to extract the set of unlocking pairs U
containing those vault pairs whose abscissa, i.e., vault features, well approx-
imate the elements encoded by B; note that, since the elements in A and B
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encode biometric features (e.g., minutiae), the similarity measure between
them (e.g., minutiae distance) can be used to determine which query fea-
tures well approximate vault features; if the unlocking pairs U dominantly
contains genuine pairs, i.e., pairs lying on the graph of a common polynomial
of degree smaller than k, the polynomial f can be recovered which deems to
be a match. In particular, if U contains at least (|U|+ k)/2 genuine pairs,
an algorithm for decoding Reed-Solomon codes can be used to recover f
efficiently (e.g., see [22,23]).
An adversary having intercepted a vault V (without knowing a matching
template), has to identify at least k genuine pairs in V. From the difficulty
in identifying k genuine pairs, the fuzzy vault scheme achieves its security.
This can be either ensured information-theoretically for suitable |F|, k, t,
and r or, which is currently of greater practical relevance, using the widely
believed computational hardness of the polynomial reconstruction problem
(see [24–26]).
2.2 The Improved Fuzzy Vault Scheme
Similar as in the original scheme, for the improved fuzzy vault scheme, it
is assumed that the biometric features measured from an individual are
encoded as a feature set A of size t containing elements in a fixed finite field
F. However, unlike the original fuzzy vault scheme, the improved fuzzy vault
does not explicitly store the reference features and, thus, does not allow to
account for small deviations in the measurement of the individual features
by comparing the features in the query set with the reference features. As a
consequence, the encoding of the features to field elements must be robust
w.r.t. typical measurement errors, and two features are considered to match
if and only if they have an equal encoding in F.
Dodis et al. proposed two variants of their improved fuzzy vault scheme:
In [14], a probabilistic version was proposed, in which, similar to the original
fuzzy vault scheme, a secret polynomial is randomly chosen and used to
hide the genuine features. In contrast, the construction proposed in [15] is
deterministic. With respect to security against recovery of the features from
the vaults, both variants are equivalent, and in our analysis, we will consider
both of them.
2.2.1 Probabilistic Variant
On enrollment, as in the original vault, a random secret polynomial f ∈ F[X]
of degree smaller than k is generated; now, the secret polynomial is bound
to the feature set A by publishing the polynomial
V (X) = f(X) +
∏
x∈A
(X − x)
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which is monic and of degree t = |A|. We denote V as a vault record of the
feature set A.
Note that, if x ∈ A, then V (x) = f(x) and thus (x, V (x)) is a genuine
pair; otherwise, if x /∈ A, then V (x) 6= f(x) and (x, V (x)) is a chaff pair.
On authentication, given the query feature set B, the unlocking set U is
computed containing the pairs (x, V (x)) where x ∈ B; the remaining, i.e.,
the attempt for decoding U, e.g., using an algorithm for decoding Reed-
Solomon codes, works analogous as on authentication in the original fuzzy
vault scheme.
Obviously, the secret polynomial f serves to protect the feature set. If
f were not added to the characteristic polynomial
χA(X) =
∏
x∈A
(X − x) = ξ0 + ξ1X + . . .+ ξt−1X
t−1 +X t
of the feature set A, the features could be efficiently recovered using an
efficient polynomial-time root-finding algorithm (e.g., via polynomial fac-
torization; see [27]). However, the recovery of the feature set A is hardened
by blinding ξ0, . . . , ξk−1 with f . Due to this randomization, the lowest k
coefficients of V do not carry any information and, hence, could even be dis-
missed without affecting the protection of the feature set A. This approach
results in the deterministic variant of the improved fuzzy vault scheme [15]
when selecting f(X) = −(ξ0 + ξX + . . .+ ξkX
k−1).
2.2.2 Deterministic Variant
The deterministic version proposed in [15] is a slight modification of the
probabilistic construction of [14] presented in the previous section. Instead
of blending the lowest k coefficients ξ0, . . . , ξk−1 of the characteristic poly-
nomial χA with a random polynomial f of degree smaller than k, these
coefficients are dismissed and just ξkX
k + · · ·+ ξt−1X
t−1 +Xt as a part of
χA is stored as the vault. Note that, in the deterministic version, the size
of the vault record is reduced by k finite field elements, i.e., k · log n bits
where n = |F|.
In order to facilitate our analysis, we will consider both variants as special
cases of a generalized improved fuzzy vault scheme, where the vault record
V is set to V = f + χA with a polynomial f of degree smaller k. In case
that f is chosen at random, we obtain the probabilistic version, and if we set
f(X) = −(ξ0 + ξX + . . .+ ξkX
k−1) we arrive at the deterministic version.
2.3 Security of Single Vault Records
In [14] and [15], Dodis et al. presented information theoretic results on the
security of both versions. In particular, they used the average min-entropy
to measure the information leaked by the vault records.
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Definition 1. The min-entropy of a variable X is defined as
H∞(X) = − log
(
max
x
(Pr[X = x])
)
,
and the average min-entropy of X given Y is defined as
H˜∞(X |Y ) = − log
(
Ey←Y
[
max
x
(Pr[X = x|Y = y])
])
,
where Ey←Y denotes expectation for y chosen at random from Y . The dif-
ference H∞(X)−H˜∞(X |Y ) is called the information leakage or entropy loss
of X by Y .
As shown in [14] and [15], the average min-entropy H˜∞(A|V ) is at least
H∞(A) − (t − k) log n. This gives an upper bound of n
−H∞(A)+t−k for
the average success probability of an attacker who tries to determine the
feature set A from the vault record V , where the average is taken over the
randomness in V . However, even in the probabilistic version of the scheme,
all information leakage results from the deterministic coefficients in the vault
record. Therefore, the bound on the success probability also holds for any
given vault record V .
In the case where all feature elements are independently and uniformly
chosen at random, the feature set A has maximal entropy log
(
n
t
)
. There-
fore, we can conclude that, unless an attacker can exploit a potential non-
uniformity and interdependency of the features, his success probability pSingle
is limited by
pSingle ≤ n
t−k/
(
n
t
)
. (1)
For n ≫ t, this can be approximated by t!/nk. On the other hand, the
best known attack method is to guess k feature elements and applying the
unlocking process of the scheme which is of success probability
(
t
k
)
/
(
n
k
)
. For
n≫ t, this can be approximated by
(
t
k
)
/nk. Thus, for n≫ t, the bound on
the average min-entropy is tight up to a factor of at most (t− k)! k!.
It is important to note that in certain applications of the scheme, it
may be possible to exploit a low entropy of the features. For instance, if
the scheme is used to protect biometric features, an attacker can randomly
choose feature sets from a large database of biometric data. As shown
in [28], such a false-accept attack can be quite efficient under practical cir-
cumstances.
3 Attacks
Subsequently, assume that an adversary is given two vaults
V (X) = f(X) +
∏
ai∈A
(X − ai) and
W (X) = g(X) +
∏
bi∈B
(X − bi)
(2)
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that protect the feature sets A and B of size t and s ≤ t, respectively,
overlapping in ω = |A∩B| elements; f and g are (yet unknown) polynomials
in F[X] of degree smaller k.
3.1 The Approach of Blanton and Aliasgari
Blanton and Aliasgari [16] observed that, if t = s and the feature sets A and
B overlap in ω elements, a system of polynomial equations in the 2(t − ω)
distinct elements can be derived from the vault records. We give a brief
summary of their approach.
Using (2), we can represent the coefficients vk, . . . , vt and wk, . . . , wt
of the vault records V and W , respectively, as vj = σt−j(a1, . . . , at) for
j = k, . . . , t and wj = σt−j(b1, . . . , bt) for j = k, . . . , t. where
σm(X1, . . . ,XN ) =
∑
J⊆{1,...,N}
|J |=m
∏
j∈J
Xj (3)
denotes them-th elementary symmetric polynomial inN variables [29] (note,
that σ0(X1, . . . ,XN ) = 1.) Assume that ai = bi for i = 1, . . . ω. Using the
identity
σm(X1, . . . ,XN ) =
m∑
i=0
σi(X1, . . . ,XM )σm−i(XM+1, . . . ,XN ), (4)
for some M < N , we obtain
vt−j − wt−j
= σj(a1, . . . , at)− σj(a1, . . . , aω, bω+1, . . . , bt)
=
j−1∑
i=0
σi(a1, . . . , aω) · (σj−i(aω+1, . . . , at)− σj−i(bω+1, . . . , bt)) ,
(5)
for j = 1, . . . , t− k. By successively inserting
σi(a1, . . . , aω) = vt−i −
i−1∑
l=0
σl(a1, . . . , aω) · σi−l(aω+1, . . . , at),
(which follows from (4) as well) for i = j − 1, . . . , 1, we can clear (5) from
all terms depending on merely a1, . . . , aω, resulting in a system of t − k
polynomial equations in the unknowns aω+1, . . . , at, bω+1, . . . , bt. If ω ≥
(t+ k)/2, this system of non-linear equations can be solved.
In this approach, two aspects remained open:
1. Can the equations be solved efficiently? Blanton and Aliasgari
suggested standard methods for solving polynomial equations and as-
sumed that this task becomes infeasible for large t and n. We disprove
this conjecture by our partial recovery attack described below.
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2. Do the solutions found indeed correspond to the correct fea-
ture set? Since the equations are of total degree up to t − k, while
there are only 2(t− ω)! many permutations of the correct feature ele-
ments, it is not clear whether there are many spurious solutions.
Our attack and its subsequent analysis give positive answers to these ques-
tions.
3.2 Partial Recovery Attack
Our partial recovery attack via record multiplicity is given by the algorithm
below.
Algorithm 1 (Partial Recovery Attack).
Input Two vault records V , W of sets A and B of size t and s ≤ t,
respectively.
Output Either a triple (ω∗,A0,B0), where ω
∗ is a candidate for |A∩B|,
A0 is a candidate for A \B, and B0 is a candidate for B \A, or Failure.
1. Apply the extended Euclidean algorithm to V and W to obtain a list
of combinations Rj = P j · V +Qj ·W .
2. Let j0 be such that deg(Qj0) is minimal where deg(Qj0)+k > deg(Rj0)
and Rj0 6= 0; if such an index does not exist, return Failure.
3. Ensure that the degree of the remainder of V divided by Qj0 is smaller
than k; otherwise, if it is greater than or equal k, return Failure.
4. Compute the roots A0 and B0 of Qj0 and P j0 , respectively; if Qj0
or P j0 do not split into distinct linear factors, then return Failure;
otherwise set ω = t− deg(Qj0) and return the triple (ω,A0,B0).
In the following, we will state provable results in which case the attack’s
output is correct.
The result of our analysis of Algorithm 1 is summarized in the following.
Its proof, which in particular uses a result from Gao [23], can be found in
the appendix in Section A.1.
Theorem 1. Let A,B ⊂ F be feature sets of size t and s ≤ t, respectively,
and let f, g ∈ F[X ] be of degree smaller than k. Furthermore, let ω = |A∩B|.
a) If the vaults V = f + χA and W = g + χB are input to Algorithm 1
where ω ≥ (t+ k)/2, then the algorithm outputs (ω,A \B,B \A).
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b) Suppose that for normalized polynomials V and W of degree t and
s, respectively, Algorithm 1 outputs (ω∗,A0,B0). Then there exists
polynomials fˆ , gˆ ∈ F[X ] of degree smaller than k and a polynomial
χ ∈ F[X ] of degree ω∗ such that V = fˆ +χ ·χA0 and W = gˆ+χ ·χB0 .
c) Algorithm 1 can be implemented using an expected number of O(t2) +
O∼(t · log |F|) operations in F.
Note that, if the system uses a Reed-Solomon decoder, successful au-
thentication requires the query feature set and the enrolled feature sets to
share at least (t+k)/2 elements. Consequently, the probability that a query
set and an enrolled set overlap in (t+k)/2 elements equals the system’s gen-
uine acceptance rate (GAR). Since, typically, during enrollment, features are
measured with at least the same accuracy as during verification, we can ex-
pect the average overlap between two enrolled sets to be at least as high as
between query sets and enrolled sets. Therefore, by Statement a) in Theo-
rem 1, we can expect that Algorithm 1 successfully links two vault records of
the same individual, and uncovers the differences between the two enrolled
feature sets with a probability at least equal to the GAR.
If Algorithm 1 outputs a triple, then, by Statement b), we cannot nec-
essarily assume that the result corresponds to feature sets protected by the
vault. The attack might output a triple (ω∗,A0,B0) even if the input vaults
protect feature sets sharing less than (t + k)/2 elements. There are three
possible cases: First, the output equals (ω,A \ B,B \ A) (in particular,
ω < (t + s)/2); second, there exists other feature sets A′,B′ in F with
ω∗ = |A′ ∩ B′|, A0 = A
′ \ B′, and B0 = B
′ \A′; third, the polynomial χ
of Statement b) does not split into linear factors in F or has multiple roots.
If the first case occurs, we call the output correct ; otherwise, we call the
output spurious. We will see later by experiments (Section 3.3.3) that the
third case definitely occurs even if ω∗ ≥ (t+ k)/2 is output.
As spurious outputs do not reveal correct information, their occurrence
are inadvertent cases for an adversary who is using the partial recovery at-
tack to link vault records across different databases (or even break them).
Therefore, if the probability of spurious outputs is reasonably high, the ad-
versary might not gain much since he cannot necessarily distinguish correct
from spurious outputs. However, in the next section we show by experiments
that the likelihood of spurious outputs can be very small in practical circum-
stances. And even if spurious outputs occur frequently, an adversary having
intercepted two vaults from which he knows that they are related, can hope
that they sufficiently overlap and try to discover their differences explicitly
via the partial recovery attack, which also eases subsequent attacks to fully
recovery the features.
10
3.3 Experiments
We conducted experiments with an implementation of Algorithm 1 for var-
ious parameters comprising configurations that we expect to encounter in
practice.2 In a nutshell, we found that the partial recovery attack is com-
putationally very efficient and outputs the differing elements if the feature
sets overlap in ω ≥ (t+k)/2 elements, and succeeds even for slightly smaller
overlaps with non-negligible probability. Furthermore, we observed that,
for ω < (t + k)/2 and typical parameters suggested for implementations of
the (original) fuzzy vault, the likelihood of spurious outputs is very small.
Consequently, we conclude that the partial recovery attack is a very efficient
tool for an adversary who is attempting to find (and uncover elements from)
related vault records from different application’s databases.
3.3.1 Partial Recovery Rates
For the ease of reading, we use the following definitions. For a set I of
non-negative integers, e.g., an interval, let pout(I) and pcor(I) be the average
probabilities among all ω ∈ I that Algorithm 1 outputs a triple and that it
outputs a correct triple, respectively; furthermore, let pout(ω) = pout({ω})
and pcor(ω) = pcor({ω}).
For each (n, t, k, ω) with n = 28, 29, . . . , 216, t = s = 24, 38, 44, k =
2, . . . , t − 1 and ω = 0, . . . , t we executed 105 tests, where we randomly
generated two feature sets A,B ⊂ F with ω = |A ∩ B|. Two random
polynomials f , g ∈ F[X ] of degree exactly k − 1 have been generated and
then the polynomials V = f + χA and W = g + χB were input to our
implementation of our partial recovery attack (Algorithm 1).
As predicted by Theorem 1, the attack was always successful for ω ≥
(t+ k)/2.
For ω < (t+ k)/2, we observed correct outputs only when t+ k was odd
and ω was maximal, i.e., ω = ⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉ (see Figure 1(a)), which is
equivalent to 2ω = t+k−1. Our experiments show, for 2ω = t+k−1 and k
not too close to t, that pcor(ω) ≈ pout(ω) ≈ 1/n, i.e., almost all outputs are
correct and the probability of a (correct) output is inversely proportional to
the size of the finite field (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). For example, for t = 38
and n = 216, the first k for which we observed a spurious output was k = 26.
As we show in Section 4.2, the success probability 1/n for 2ω = t + k − 1
is asymptotically optimal up to a constant for fixed t and n → ∞. The
same success probability is achieved by an attack that, after guessing one
element from (A∪B)\(A∩B), solves the equations of Blanton and Aliasgari
(see Section 3.2); however, Algorithm 1, beside being computationally more
2Our experiments can be reproduced using a C++ li-
brary THIMBLE of which source can be downloaded from
http://www.stochastik.math.uni-goettingen.de/biometrics/thimble. Note that a
tutorial on how to run the attack is contained in the documentation.
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(a) Plot of pcor(⌈(t+k)/2−1⌉) for varying
k and different n at t = 24.
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pout(⌈(t+ k)/2 − 1⌉)
(b) Plot of pcor(⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉) and
pout(⌈(t+k)/2−1⌉) for varying k at t = 24
and n = 28.
Figure 1: Plots for the frequencies at which Algorithm 1 outputs a triple
and at which an output triple is correct for ω = ⌈(t+ k)/2− 1⌉.
efficient (see below), has the advantage that, unless k is close to t, due to
pcor(ω) ≈ pout(ω) there is high assurance that the output is indeed correct.
When k approaches t, the probability of spurious (incorrect) output
triples increases drastically, and, thus, most output triples become spuri-
ous, but, yet, the probability pcor(⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉) of a correct output is at
least 1/n. Precisely, pcor(⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉) approximates 1/n for k = t − 3
and is slightly higher and dependent on t for k = t− 1 (Figure 2).
We summarize that the partial recovery attack is a serious threat even
for 2ω = t+ k− 1, unless extremely large finite fields are used (which would
render the scheme impractical).
As stated before, for ω < ⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉ no correct outputs were ob-
served, but nevertheless, Algorithm 1 sometimes output a (spurious) triple.
Our experiments indicate that pout(ω) is independent of ω as long as ω <
⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉: For fixed n, t, k, the variance of the observed frequencies
pout(0), . . . , pout(⌈(t+ k)/2− 2⌉) was close to zero, specifically, smaller than
3.6 · 10−6. Therefore, we considered the probability pout({ω < ⌈(t + k)/2 −
2⌉}), which is averaged over all ω ∈ [0, ⌈(t + k)/2 − 2⌉]. We observed that
pout({ω < ⌈(t + k)/2 − 1⌉}) decreases exponentially as t− k increases, and
does not depend on t (Figure 3(a)) or on the field size n (Figure 3(b)).
We also kept track of the computer time required to run the partial
recovery attack. In particular, for each combination of (n, t, k, ω) that we
tested, running a single partial recovery attack could be performed in less
than 25ms in average on a single core of a 2.6 GHz server. Moreover, in
order to demonstrate the efficiency of our implementation of the attack for
extreme parameters, we ran 105 tests for randomly chosen vault pairs where
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(a) For k = t − 3, the average likelihood
pcor(⌈(t+k)/2−1⌉) plotted versus the field
size n.
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(b) For k = t − 1, the average likeli-
hood pcor(⌈(t+ k)/2− 1⌉) plotted ver-
sus the field size n.
Figure 2: Plots for pcor(ω) at the critical ω = ⌈(t+ k)/2− 1⌉.
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(a) Plot of pout({ω < ⌈(t+ k)/2− 1⌉}) for
varying k at n = 216.
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(b) Plot of pout({ω < ⌈(t+k)/2−1⌉}) for
varying k at t = 24.
Figure 3: Plots for the average frequencies at which Algorithm 1 outputs a
triple provided ω < ⌈(t+ k)/2− 1⌉.
n = 216, t = s = 256, k = 200, and ω = 228 which consumed approximately
34ms in average on the same computer.
3.3.2 Discussion
Our experiments show that, unless k is close to t, our attack efficiently and
reliably determines if two vault records are related, i.e., if the protected
feature sets overlap in at least (t + k)/2 elements and, if true, recovers
the feature elements in which the sets differ. In implementations of the
(original) fuzzy vault for biometric template protection, typically, k < t/2,
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which implies that almost all outputs of the attack are correct. For example,
for the parameters t = 24, k = 9, . . . , 11, and n = 216 used by a minutiae-
based fuzzy vault in [5], all output triples observed in our experiments were
correct. The same holds true for the parameters t = 38 and k = 15 used
by [3] and t = 44 and k = 7, . . . , 12 used in a minutiae-based implementation
eligible for the improved fuzzy vault scheme [30].
We conclude that the partial recovery attack is a serious risk that must
be taken into account when designing systems based on the improved fuzzy
vault scheme. The recovered elements may even be used to ease full recovery
of the templates. In Section 3.4, we develop a full recovery attack based on
our partial recovery attack for which it can be even proven that it is optimal
in an information theoretic sense.
3.3.3 Analysis of Spurious Outputs
Our experiments have shown that, for ω < (t+k)/2, Algorithm 1 sometimes
returns incorrect outputs, in particular, if k is close to t. In order to verify
that Statement b) of Theorem 1 cannot be strengthened, i.e., that there
are indeed outputs that do not correspond to a solution in the base field
F, we conducted additional experiments. In these experiments, we used the
outputs (ω∗,A0,B0) of Algorithm 1 as a starting point for a full exhaustive
search for sets Aˆ ⊃ A0 and Bˆ ⊃ B0 so that V = fˆ + χAˆ and W = gˆ + χBˆ.
For n = 28, t = 10, k = 3, and ω = 5, we observed that in pout(ω) ≈
0.01034% of 107 tests the partial recovery attack output a triple (ω∗,A0,B0);
furthermore, we found ω∗ ≥ (t + k)/2 for 94.39072% of the output triple.
However, our exhaustive search found no feature sets Aˆ ⊃ A0 and Bˆ ⊃ B0
in F protected by the vaults. Hence, we confirmed that Algorithm 1 can
indeed output spurious triples that do not correspond to feature sets in F
— even if a triple with ω∗ ≥ (t+ k)/2 is output.
3.4 Full Recovery Attack
For ω ≥ (t+k)/2, our partial recovery attack allows to efficiently determine
from vault records of sufficiently overlapping feature sets those elements that
are not in both sets. If the number ǫ = t − ω of recovered elements of the
feature set A is at least k, they can be used to ease full recovery of A. Note
that for t ≥ 3k+ 2x with x ≥ 0, we have ǫ ≥ k whenever ω ≤ (t+ k)/2− x.
In the case ǫ < k, although the known feature elements do not allow
deterministic recovery of the complete feature sets, it can increase the success
probability of full recovery attacks. In [16] it was suggested to guess the
remaining feature elements, resulting in a success probability of
(
n−δ−ǫ
t−ǫ
)
where δ is the number of elements recovered from B. However, due to the
error correction capabilities of the scheme, it suffices to guess only k − ǫ
many feature elements, resulting in a success probability of
(
ω
k−ǫ
)
/
(
n
k−ǫ
)
.
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We extend this approach to smaller ω. The basic idea is to guess a
sufficient number of elements from A\B and B\A until the sets A′ and B′
of remaining elements satisfy the condition for the partial recovery attack
with correspondingly reduced parameters. To compute the vault records
V ′ and W ′ of the reduced sets from the original vault records, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let A be a feature set of size t and v0, . . . , vt be the coefficients
of the characteristic polynomial χA(X) of A. Let a ∈ A and w0, . . . , wt−1
be the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial χA\{a}. Then, for m =
k, . . . t− 2
wm = vm+1 + a · wm+1 (6)
In particular, the coefficients w0, . . . , wt−1 are given by the equations
wm =
t∑
i=m+1
ai−m−1vi. (7)
Proof. From χA(X) = (X−a)χA′(X), we get Equation (6) form = k, . . . t−
2. By recursively applying this equation and using wt−1 = vt = 1 we obtain
Equation (7).
3.4.1 The Attack
We next describe the algorithmic of our full recovery attack.
Algorithm 2 (Full Recovery Attack).
Input Two vault records V (X) =
∑t
j=0 vj ·X
j and W (X) =
∑s
j=0wj ·X
j
of sets A and B, respectively, with t ≥ s, and a natural number ω′ as can-
didate for ω = |A ∩B|.
Output Either a candidate pair for (A,B), or Failure.
1. Initialize h← max (0, ⌈(t + k)/2⌉ − ω′) and A∗ ← ∅.
2. If h > 0, reduce the vault records V and W as follows.
(a) Guess h elements a1, . . . , ah from A \ B and use (7) to itera-
tively compute the coefficients (v¯k−h, . . . , v¯t−h) of the character-
istic polynomial χ
A¯
of A¯ = A\{a1, . . . , ah} from (vk, . . . , vt) and
add {a1, . . . , ah} to A
∗.
(b) Guess h elements b1, . . . , bh from B \A and use (7) to iteratively
compute the coefficients (w¯k−h, . . . , w¯s−h) of the characteristic
polynomial χ
B¯
of B¯ = B \ {b1, . . . , bh} from (wk, . . . , ws).
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Otherwise, if h = 0, let (v¯k, . . . , v¯t)← (vk, . . . , vt) and (w¯k, . . . , w¯s)←
(wk, . . . , vs).
3. Invoke the partial recovery attack (Algorithm 1) with input
∑t¯
j=k¯ v¯j ·
Xj and
∑s¯
j=k¯ w¯j ·X
j where t¯ = t−h, s¯ = s−h and k¯ = k−h (here, k¯
is the degree of the secret polynomials); if the partial recovery attack
returns Failure, do so as well; otherwise, if (ω∗,A0,B0) is the output
of Algorithm 1, add A∗ ← A0 ∪A
∗ to A∗ and update ω′ ← ω∗.
4. If ǫ′ = t− ω′ < k, guess m = k − ǫ′ many elements aǫ′+1, . . . , ak from
A ∩B and add them to A∗.
5. Unlock V using A∗: Compute the unique polynomial f∗ of degree
smaller than k interpolating the pairs (a, V (a)) for all a ∈ A∗. If
V − f∗ splits into distinct linear factors, set A′ as the set of its roots;
otherwise return Failure.
6. Set S = A′ \ (A0 ∪ {a1, . . . , ah}) as candidate for A ∩ B, set B
′ =
B0 ∪ {b1, . . . , bh} ∪ S, and output (A
′,B′).
If ω ≥ (t + k)/2, the full recovery attack should be run with input
ω′ = ⌈(t+k)/2⌉ which will be updated to the correct ω in Step 3; otherwise,
if ω < (t+k), the full recovery attack requires that ω′ = ω has been guessed
correctly; even if ω′ = ω, the attack may return Failure and this happens
if the elements guessed in Step 2a, 2b, or 4 are incorrect of which probability
pFull can be lower bounded by the following theorem.
3.4.2 Analysis
Theorem 2. Assume t ≥ s ≥ k and ω′ = ω. Then Algorithm 2 outputs
(A,B) with probability
pFull ≥
(
t−ω
h
)(
s−ω
h
)(
ω
m
)
(
n
h
)2(n
m
)
where h = max (0, ⌈(t + k)/2⌉ − ω) and m = max (0, k − ǫ).
Furthermore, if ω > max(k, t/2) + φ(t+ k), where φ(N) is the parity bit
of an integer N , the number of elements that Algorithm 2 guesses in Step 2
and 4 is smaller than k, and consequently, pFull ∈ O(n
k−1) for fixed t.
Proof. With probability (
t−ω
h
)(
s−ω
h
)
(
n
h
)2
the guesses in Step 2 are correct. In this case, ω ≥ (¯t+ k¯)/2 and, hence, the
partial recovery attack outputs A0 = A¯ \ B¯ = (A \ B) \ {a1, . . . , ah} and
B0 = (B \A) \ {b1, . . . , bh}.
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Furthermore, the probability that the guesses in Step 4 are correct is at
least
(
ω
m
)
/
(
n
m
)
. Assuming success in the previous steps, we have A∗ = A\B,
which has ǫ elements. If, in Step 4, all k− ǫ elements were correctly guessed
from A ∩ B, then A∗ contains k elements from A, and thus, we obtain
A′ = A. The probability that these guesses are correct is at least
(
ω
m
)
/
(
n
m
)
.
Finally, provided that the guesses in Step 2 were correct, we get S =
A ∩ B and, therefore, B′ = B. Multiplying all probabilities completes the
proof of the first claim.
The number of elements guessed in Step 2a, 2b and 4 is 2h +m. Since
both variables, h and m are defined with a maximum function, we need to
distinguish different cases.
First consider the case ǫ < k, which implies m = k − ǫ. In this case,
if ω < ⌈(t + k)/2⌉, we have h = ⌈(t + k)/2⌉ − ω, and, hence, 2h + m
evaluates to 2k − ω if t+ k is even, and to 2k − ω + 1 if t+ k is odd. Since
ω > k + φ(t+ k), in either case, the result is smaller than k. On the other
hand, if ω ≥ ⌈(t+k)/2⌉, we have h = 0, and 2h+m evaluates to k− ǫ which
is obviously smaller than k.
Now consider the case ǫ ≥ k, which implies m = 0. In this case, if
ω < ⌈(t+ k)/2⌉, we have h = ⌈(t+ k)/2⌉ − ω, and, hence, 2h+m evaluates
to t + k − 2ω if t + k is even, and to t + k − 2ω + 1 if t + k is odd. Since
ω > t/2+ φ(t+ k), in either case, the result is smaller than k. On the other
hand, if ω ≥ ⌈(t+ k)/2⌉, we have h = 0, and 2h+m evaluates to zero.
Theorem 2 shows that for ω > max(k, t/2) + φ(t + k) and large finite
fields, our full recovery attack is better than the obvious attack that guesses
k elements ofA∩B and uses them to recover both feature sets. For smaller ω,
however, it is more efficient to guess min(k, ω) elements of A∩B and, if ω <
k, additional k−ω elements of each of the difference sets A\B and B\A. In
Section 4, we will show that our attack is, for ω ≥ min (t− k, (t+ k)/2), even
asymptotically optimal in an information theoretical sense, when considering
its probability as a function in n.
3.4.3 Brute-Force Attack
While executing Algorithm 2 reveals the feature sets with the probability
estimated in Theorem 2, a real attacker typically wishes to increase the
success probability at the cost of computation time. This can obviously
be achieved by repeating Algorithm 2 with different guesses, if it has been
unsuccessful.
The attacker knows that the full recovery has failed as soon as the partial
recovery attack invoked in Step 3 returns Failure or when unlocking V fails
in Step 5. Furthermore, in some circumstances, additional information may
be available to distinguish the correct from wrong outputs; for example,
many implementations of the original fuzzy vault encode a CRC code into
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the secret polynomials [4–6, 31, 32] or store a cryptographic hash value of
its coefficients [30, 33] to aid verification of its correctness. In such a case,
most wrong outputs can be detected using an additional final check and the
attack can be retried. Otherwise, i.e., if such a check is not possible, the
attacker can only output a list of all candidate feature sets, the size of which
depends on the parameters (see [2]).
Clearly, it is not necessary to repeat the complete Algorithm 2. Instead
the following iteration approach can be applied. For each successful output
of the partial recovery attack in Step 3, the attacker can fix the output and
successively try all tuples (aǫ′+1, . . . , ak) in Step 4. For fixed ω
′ ≥ (t+ k)/2,
this already represents a complete exhaustive search attack. On the other
hand, if ω′ < (t + k)/2, the outcome in Step 3 depends on the guesses in
Step 2 and thus an attacker facing an error in Step 3 (if Algorithm 1 returns
Failure), in Step 5 (if unlocking V fails), or in the additional final check for
correctness (if implemented), can go back to Step 1 and repeat the complete
Algorithm 2 choosing in Step 2 the next a1, . . . , ah and b1, . . . , bh.
If ω is unknown, the attack should start with ω′ = ⌈(t + k)/2⌉ for two
reasons. First, for this input, no guessing is done in Step 2 resulting in
an exponentially smaller search space as compared to smaller values of ω′
(where we have h > 0); second, if ω ≥ ω′ = ⌈(t + k)/2⌉, Algorithm 1 is
guaranteed to succeed in Step 3. If trying ω′ does not yield the correct result,
the attack can proceed by successively decreasing ω′, each decrementation
resulting in an increase of the search space by a factor of n2. When the
search space becomes too large, i.e., at a certain value of ω′, the attack has
to abort.
An exhaustive search algorithm can be obtained by replacing the ran-
dom guesses in Algorithm 2 by systematically trying all tuples. However, a
probabilistic method is more efficient, because, typically, there exist many
tuples that will result in a correct output. If θ is the fraction of tuples in
the search space resulting in a correct output, a probabilistic search will, on
average, succeed after 1/θ trials and, according to Markov’s inequality, will
succeed with probability at least 1−1/γ, for any γ > 1, after γ/θ trials. For
instance, in Step 4, provided that the previous steps have been successful,(
t−ω
k−ǫ
)
out of all possible tuples will result in a correct output. Thus, for
Γ =
(
t−ω
k−ǫ
)
/γ > 1, trying only a random Γ-fraction of all possible tuples, the
attacker will gain a speed-up of Γ as compared to exhaustive search, while
having an error error probability of at most 1/γ.
On the other hand, an exhaustive search algorithm can be useful for
analyzing purposes. In Section 3.3.3, for example, we used exhaustive search
to experimentally determine the frequency with which the outputs of the
partial recovery attack corresponds to a solutions in F.
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4 Theoretical Bounds for Recovery Attacks
In this section, we derive bounds for the success probability of partial and
full recovery attacks. These bounds are based on an upper bound for the
information leakage, i.e., a lower bound for the average min-entropy, of
two vault records based on overlapping feature sets. Our bounds are based
on information theoretical results and, thus, hold even for attackers with
unlimited computational resources, i.e., also for attackers with exponential
running time. Of course, these results assume that the attacker is not able
to verify the correctness of a candidate feature set by additional information,
e.g., by a stored hash value or a CRC code of the secret polynomial f , as
often suggested in implementations of the original fuzzy vault [4,5,30,31,33].
4.1 Bounds for Full Recovery Attacks
The following result bounds the amount of information leaked from two vault
records computed from overlapping feature sets. The proof of the theorem
is given in the appendix.
Theorem 3. Let A and B be two feature sets of size t and s ≤ t, respec-
tively. Then the entropy loss of vault records V and W computed from A
and B, respectively, is at most min(t+ s− 2k, t− k + d) log n, i.e.,
H˜∞(A,B|V ,W ) ≥ H∞(A,B)−min (t+ s− 2k, t− k + d) log n,
where d = |(A ∪B) \ (A ∩B)| is the set difference between A and B.
If the feature sets overlap in ω elements, we have d = t+ s− 2ω. Thus,
for ω ≥ (t+ k)/2, Theorem 3 gives an estimate for the information leakage
of (2t+ s− 2ω − k) log n, whereas, for ω ≤ (t+ k)/2, we obtain a bound of
(t+ s− 2k) log n.
Since the lower k coefficients of the vault record are either zero (determin-
istic version) or independent of the features and the remaining coefficients
are deterministic, the estimation provided by Theorem 3 does not only hold
in the average case for random vault records, but also for any fixed vault
records V ,W . Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Any algorithm that takes as input two vault records V and
W computed from feature sets A and B of size t and s ≤ t, respectively,
overlapping in ω elements, and outputs A,B has success probability
pFull ≤ 2
−H∞(A,B) · nmin(t+s−2k, 2t+s−2ω−k). (8)
Observe that for t ≥ 3k, Theorem 3 does not give positive bounds on the
average min-entropy for any ω ∈ [2k, t− k], and thus, Corollary 1 does not
give a meaningful upper bound for attacks. In this case, (t+ k)/2 ≤ t− k.
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While for ω ∈ [⌈(t+k)/2⌉, t−k], the vaults records can indeed be uncovered
deterministically, i.e., without any guessing, using Algorithm 2, it is not
clear if the vault records become insecure for ω ∈ [2k, ⌊(t+ k)/2⌋ − 1].
We now analyze to which extent and for which parameters the success
probability of Algorithm 2 is optimal. Obviously, this is the case, when
it becomes deterministic, i.e., for ω ∈ [⌈(t + k)/2⌉, t − k]. However, as
soon as feature elements need to be guessed, no attack can have optimal
success probability for arbitrary feature spaces, unless it takes into account
the specific statistical distribution. Therefore, we subsequently focus on the
ideal situation, in which the feature sets A and B have maximal entropy.
For this case, the following corollary pins down the parameters, for which
our full recovery attack’s success probability is asymptotically optimal in n
up to a constant.
Corollary 2. Assume that the elements in the feature sets are independently
and uniformly chosen at random, so that the feature sets A and B overlap
in ω elements, where ω ≥ t − k with t + k being even, or ω ≥ (t + k)/2.
Then the success probability of Algorithm 2 is optimal for n → ∞ up to a
constant.
Proof. For independently and uniformly chosen feature elements, we have
2H∞(A,B) =
(
n
ω
)(
n− ω
t− ω
)(
n− t
s− ω
)
,
which is in O(nt+s−ω) for n→∞.
Theorem 3 gives different bounds for ω ≥ (t+k)/2 and for ω < (t+k)/2.
Consequently, we will distinguish these two main cases in our analysis.
We first consider the case ω ≥ (t+ k)/2. In this case, Corollary 1 gives
an upper bound of pFull ≤ n
2t+s−2ω−k/2H∞(A,B) for the success probability
pFull of attackers trying to determine the feature sets from two vault records.
This implies pFull ∈ O
(
n−(k−ǫ)
)
, where, as before, ǫ = t− ω.
In comparison, for ω ≥ (t + k)/2 (which implies h = 0), Theorem 2
estimates the success probability pAlg2 of Algorithm 2 as pAlg2 ≥
(
ω
m
)
/
(
n
m
)
. If
ω ≤ t−k, we have m = 0 and our full recovery attack is deterministic, which
is obviously optimal. If, on the other hand, ω > t− k, the estimate of The-
orem 2 evaluates to pAlg2 ≥
(
ω
k−ǫ
)
/
(
n
k−ǫ
)
, which implies pAlg2 ∈ Ω
(
n−(k−ǫ)
)
.
Now consider ω < (t + k)/2. In this case, Corollary 1 gives the upper
bound pFull ≤ n
t+s−2k/2H∞(A,B). This yields pFull ∈ O
(
n−(2k−ω)
)
.
On the other hand, for ω < (t+k)/2, we have h = ⌈(t+k)/2⌉−ω. Thus,
Theorem 2 gives an estimate of pAlg2 ≥
(
t−ω
h
)2(ω
m
)(
n
h
)−2(n
m
)−1
, which gives
pAlg2 ∈ Ω
(
n−(2h+m)
)
. By assumption, for ω < (t+ k)/2, we have ω ≥ t− k
and t + k being even, which implies m = k + ω − t and 2h = t + k − 2ω.
This gives the result for the case ω < (t+ k)/2.
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For ω ∈ [⌈(t + k)/2⌉, t − k] with odd t + k, the success probability of
Algorithm 2 is less optimal due to rounding of the value h. However, solving
the equations of Blanton and Aliasgari described in Section 3.2 after guessing
t+k−2ω elements from (A∪B)\(A∩B) gives an attack with optimal success
probability even for odd t + k, albeit being computationally inefficient for
large t.
For ω < min (t− k, (t+ k)/2), Algorithm 2 has success probability p ∈
Ω
(
n−(t+k)
)
which is not asymptotically optimal. However, for ω ≤ k,
the obvious attack that guesses all ω elements from A ∩ B and k − ω el-
ements from each A \ B and B \ A has, for t = s, success probability
pFull ≥
(
t−ω
k−ω
)2
/
(
n
k−ω
)−2(n
ω
)
, which is tight with the asymptotic upper bound
O
(
n−(2k−ω)
)
derived from Corollary 1. Thus, this simple attack is asymp-
totically optimal for ω ≤ k.
4.2 Lower Bounds for Partial Recovery Attacks
As pointed out in [34], bounds on the average min-entropy do not, in gen-
eral, guarantee that no partial information can be extracted. Our partial
recovery attack is an example, and, in fact, the amount of information we
are able to extract (d feature elements) is still smaller than the bound on
the information leakage given in Theorem 3, which corresponds to at least
t−k+d elements. Thus, the question arises if it was possible to recover even
more feature elements from vault records of overlapping feature sets. In this
section, for a wide range of parameters, we give a negative answers to this
question when considering field-independent attacks and, hence, show that
our partial recovery attack is indeed optimal with respect to the number of
extracted elements.
The following result shows that, for ω > t−k, no algorithm can determine
elements from the intersection of two feature sets from corresponding vault
records with probability asymptotically better than O(n−1).
Theorem 4. For fixed t ≥ s ≥ ω > t− k, any algorithm that takes as input
two vault records of uniformly chosen feature sets A and B of size t and
s, respectively, with |A ∩ B| = ω, and outputs an element a ∈ A ∩ B, has
success probability p ∈ O(n−1). Specifically,
p ≤ nt−k
(
n
k−1
)
(
n
t
)(
t−1
k−1
) .
Proof. Assume that A is an algorithm that takes as input two vault records
V andW of feature setsA andB of size t and s ≤ t, respectively, overlapping
in ω > t− k elements, and outputs an element a ∈ A ∩B with probability
pA. We will use A to construct an algorithm B, that takes as input a single
vault record V of a feature set A of size t and outputs A. Then, using the
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bound on the average min-entropy of single vault records from [14], we will
derive a bound for pA.
Algorithm B works as follows.
1. Guess ǫ = t − ω many elements a1, . . . , aǫ from A and use (7) to
iteratively compute from the coefficients vk, . . . , vt of V the coeffi-
cients (zk−ǫ, . . . , zω) of the characteristic polynomial χS of S = A \
{a1, . . . , aǫ}.
2. Select δ = s − ω many random elements {b1, . . . , bδ} from F \ S, and
use Equation (6) in Lemma 1 to iteratively compute from the coef-
ficients (zk−ǫ, . . . , zω) the coefficients wk, . . . , ws of the characteristic
polynomial χB of B = S ∪ {b1, . . . , bδ}.
3. Invoke Algorithm A with input V and W = (wk, . . . , ws). Let a0 be
the output of A.
4. Guess k − ǫ− 1 many elements aǫ+1, . . . , ak−1 of A \ {a0, a1, . . . , aǫ}.
5. Unlock A: compute the unique polynomial f∗ of degree smaller than k
interpolating the pairs (aj , V (aj)) for j = 0, . . . , k− 1. If V − f
∗ splits
into distinct linear factors, output A as the set of its roots; otherwise
return Failure.
The probability that all elements a1, . . . , ak−1 are guessed correctly, is at
least (
t
ǫ
)(
t− ǫ− 1
k − ǫ− 1
)(
n
k − 1
)−1
≤
(
t− 1
k − 1
)(
n
k − 1
)−1
,
and with probability pA algorithm A outputs an a0 ∈ A ∩ B = A \
{a1, . . . , aǫ}. The claim now follows directly from the lower bound (1) for
the success probability pSingle of attacks on single vault records.
Note, that the condition ω > t − k in Theorem 4 cannot be relaxed,
because, as explained in Section 3.4, for ω ≤ t − k, our partial recovery
attack allows to completely recover the feature set A with probability 1.
For t = s = ω, we have only one feature set and, thus, we obtain the
following corollary which limits the success probability of partial recovery
attacks on single vault records.
Corollary 3. For fixed t, any algorithm that takes as input a vault record
of a uniformly chosen feature set A of size t and outputs an element a ∈ A,
has success probability p ∈ O(n−1). Specifically,
p ≤ nt−k
(
n
k−1
)
(
n
t
)(
t−1
k−1
) .
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The next result states that, for t − k ≤ ω < (t + k)/2 or ω ≤ k, no
partial recovery attack can determine any element a ∈ A with non-negligible
probability for all field sizes. The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 5. Let t ≥ s and (t + k)/2 > ω ≥ t − k or ω ≤ k. Then, any
algorithm that takes as input two vault records of uniformly chosen feature
sets A and B of size t and s, respectively, with |A ∩ B| = ω, and outputs
an element a ∈ (A ∪B) \ (A ∩B), has success probability p ∈ O(n−1).
Unfortunately, we are not able to extend Theorem 5 to all ω < t− k. A
reason for this is that, for t ≥ 3k, Theorem 3 does not give positive bounds
on the average min-entropy for any ω ∈ [2k, t− k]. Note that t ≥ 3k implies
t− k ≥ (t+ k)/2 and, thus, the claim of Theorem 5 becomes empty in that
case.
At least for k ≥ t/2, Theorem 5 covers all ω < (t+ k)/2. Therefore, we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let t ≥ s, k ≥ t/2 and ω < (t+ k)/2 . Then, any algorithm
that takes as input two vault records of uniformly chosen feature sets A and
B of size t and s, respectively, with |A ∩ B| = ω, and outputs an element
a ∈ (A ∪B) \ (A ∩B), has success probability p ∈ O(n−1).
5 Preventions
In this section, we discuss possible preventions to avoid an adversary from
running the partial recovery attack in order to cross-match the vaults or
even recover the feature elements.
5.1 Use the Original Fuzzy Vault Scheme
The partial recovery attack (Algorithm 1) presented in this paper makes use
of the representation of the vault records as polynomials. Thus, the attack
apparently cannot be applied to the original fuzzy vault scheme. However,
to ensure that the original fuzzy vault resists correlation attacks [18], it is
necessary to use a number of chaff points that is close to the maximum, i.e.,
to set almost all unoccupied points as chaff; this measure however, implies
a significant increase of memory each vault record consumes.
5.2 Protection by Additional Secrets
An obvious countermeasure is to encrypt the vaults by a system-wide or user-
specific secret key [21], or to combine the features with a user password [32].
However, with this measure, the security and robustness of the scheme relies
on the secrecy and availability, respectively, of the key or password, exactly
the constraint that biometric cryptosystems aim to remove [35]; in fact, the
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fuzzy vault scheme has been promoted as a key-less template protection
scheme [36].
5.3 Re-Ordering of the Feature Encodings
Analogously to the random basis transformations suggested to prevent record
multiplicity attacks against the fuzzy commitment scheme [19], the (public)
encoding of the feature space into the finite field F may be randomized.
The encoding may be chosen record-specific or system-wide, depending on
whether users may perform several enrollments or not. The random encod-
ing can be compared to a password salt in that it does not need to be kept
secret but aims at distorting the stored reference information.
Obviously, if n ≫ t, randomly chosen encodings ensure that, with high
probability, the representations (encodings) of two arbitrary feature sets
share only a small number of field elements. Hence, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the random permutation between the two encodings destroys any
algebraic similarities that could be exploited by attacks. However, further
research is required to confirm this assumption.
When using random record-specific encodings, a full code table must be
stored along with the vault record. However, using pseudo-random func-
tions, encodings can be efficiently generated from small seeds, e.g., from
counters, greatly reducing the storage requirements for the records.
Due to its simplicity, effectiveness, and the absence of clear drawbacks,
the random encoding is a very promising approach.
5.4 Additional Randomness
Roughly speaking, the partial recovery attack (Algorithm 1) processes the
upper coefficients of the improved fuzzy vault scheme. Therefore, an ap-
proach to thwart the attack is to add additional randomness to the upper
coefficients. However, in order to allow recovery of the secret polynomial in
genuine verification attempts and to prevent it in impostor attempts, the
randomization should preserve the property that V (x) = f(x) holds exactly
for the genuine feature elements. This can be achieved by multiplying the
characteristic polynomial χA(X) of A with a random polynomial having no
roots in F, before adding it to the secret polynomial V .
One method to efficiently choose such a polynomial is to select a random
blending set Abl with elements in K \F, where K is an extension field of F,
and to use the characteristic polynomial χAbl. Precisely, for a set A of size t
of features encoded as elements in F, select the secret polynomial f ∈ K[X]
of degree smaller than k,3 generate a random blending set Abl of size tbl
3As before, f can be chosen at random, resulting in a probabilistic version, or set to the
negative of the lowest k terms of χ
Abl
·χ
A
to obtain a deterministic version with reduced
record size.
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with elements from K \F and compute the vault record as the polynomial
V (X) = f(X) + χAbl(X) · χA(X). (9)
To see how this randomization helps to prevent our attack, suppose that
we are given a second vault with additional randomness W = g + χBbl · χB
where g ∈ K[X ] is of degree smaller than k, B ⊂ F encodes s ≤ t features,
and randomly chosen Bbl ⊂ K\F of size sbl. For simplicity, we assume that
sbl + s = tbl + t such that V and W are of the same degree. To successfully
apply Algorithm 1 (in the extension field), the requirement
|Abl ∩Bbl|+ ω ≥ (tbl + t+ k)/2, (10)
with ω = |A∩B|, must be fulfilled; the requirement ω ≥ (t+k)/2 is neither
sufficient nor necessary for (10).
Since ω ≤ t, the requirement (10) is fulfilled only if
|Abl ∩Bbl| ≥ (tbl − t+ k)/2.
This yields a criterion how the new parameters tbl and |K| has to be chosen
to effectively thwart the partial recovery attack.
The described modification increases the size of the vault records from
t log |F| to (t+ tbl) log |K| (in the probabilistic version).
6 Discussion
In this paper, we presented a new attack via record multiplicity against the
improved fuzzy vault scheme of Dodis et al. [14, 15]. Using the extended
Euclidean algorithm, our attack links two vault records of the same individ-
ual with high probability (equal to the genuine acceptance rate for systems
based on a Reed-Solomon decoder) and uncovers the elements, e.g., the bio-
metric data, in which the feature sets protected by the records differ. The
algorithm is very efficient running in random polynomial time and can be
proved to succeed provided that the two feature sets overlap sufficiently. We
thereby disproved the conjecture of Blanton and Aliasgari [16] that solving
the equations given by two related vault records is computationally infeasible
if the parameters are not small. The experiments we conducted empirically
verified the effectiveness and reliability of the attack for parameters that can
be expected in practice; in particular, we demonstrated that, typically, the
probability of spurious outputs, i.e., false positives, is very small.
For certain parameters, specifically for t ≫ k and ω ≥ (t + k)/2 not
too large, the recovery of the differing feature elements already allows full
recovery of the protected feature sets. For the general case, we showed
how the partial recovery of the feature by our attack can be extended to
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a probabilistic full recovery method, resulting in a significantly improved
brute-force attack as compared to previous approaches [37].
On the other hand, we derived bounds for the information leakage from
multiple vault records, which allows to bound the success probability of
attacks via record multiplicity. Using these bounds we were able to show
that our partial and full recovery attacks are asymptotically optimal for
a wide range of parameters, and could even prove the general result that
related vault records do not reveal any elements from the overlap of the
protected feature sets.
Our work confirms that additional countermeasures are necessary in or-
der to allow secure reuse of the improved fuzzy vault scheme. We presented
several approaches to thwart record multiplicity attacks without modifying
the general properties of the scheme; in particular, (pseudo-)random embed-
ding of the features into the finite field seems to be a promising approach.
However, further research is needed to give theoretical evidence for its effec-
tiveness.
As a final remark, we stress that, generally, attacks against biometric
cryptosystems should not only be considered from an information theoretic
but also from a complexity theoretic point of view, which is currently of
greater practical relevance for modalities such as fingerprints (e.g., see [38]).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of a)
We show that Algorithm 1 outputs a correct triple if there exist feature
sets A and B protected by V and W sharing at least (t + k)/2 elements.
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Therefore, let ω = |A ∩B| and set
P (X) = χB\A(X) =
∏
x∈B\A
(X − x) and
Q(X) = χA\B(X) =
∏
x∈A\B
(X − x)
(11)
Furthermore, we write
ǫ = deg(Q) and δ = deg(P ).
We prove the desired statement with the following.
Lemma 2. Suppose that ω ≥ (t+ k)/2 and let
Rj = P j · V +Qj ·W
be the sequence in the extended Euclidean algorithm applied to V and W
(e.g., Algorithm 3.6 in [27]). Set
L = { j | 0 ≤ deg(Rj) < deg(Qj) + k }
and j0 = argminj∈L
(
deg(Qj)
)
. Then P = α · P j0 and Q = −α · Qj0 for a
non-zero α ∈ F.
To show that the lemma in fact holds, we apply a lemma of Gao (Lemma
3.2 in [23]) which we state first using our notation such it easily applies to
our situation.
Lemma 3 (Gao 2002). Let V (X) = χ(X)P (X) + f(X) and W (X) =
χ(X)Q(X) + g(X), with gcd(P ,Q) = 1 and
deg(P ),deg(Q) ≤ ǫ, deg(f),deg(g) ≤ k − 1.
Suppose that ω satisfies
deg(χ) ≥ ω > k − 1 + ǫ.
Apply the extended Euclidean algorithm to V and W to obtain the sequence
Rj = P j · V +Qj ·W.
Let jω be minimal such that deg(Rjω) < ω. Then there exists a non-zero
α ∈ F with P jω = α · P and Qjω = −α ·Q.
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Proof of Lemma 2. We first verify that the requirements of Lemma 3 are
fulfilled for χ = χA∩B. Therefore, note that the polynomials P and Q
are in fact co-prime. Furthermore, ǫ ≥ δ which is implied by the relation
t+ δ = s+ ǫ; thus, ǫ is an upper bound for deg(P ) and deg(Q). Note that
ǫ = t− ω and that 2ω ≥ t+ k. Hence
k − 1 + ǫ = k + t− ω − 1 < ω
and thus the requirements of Lemma 3 are fulfilled.
Consequently, there exists a jω with P jω = α ·P and Qjω = −α ·Q for a
non-zero field element α, and deg(Rjω) < ω. It follows that P jω ·χA+Qjω ·
χB = 0 and thus,
Rjω = α (P · f −Q · g) ,
which implies jω ∈ L (and, in particular, that L is not empty).
By definition of j0, we have deg(Qj0) ≤ deg(Qjω) < t − ω. On the
other hand, since deg(Rj0) < t, both summands P j0 · V and Qj0 · W of
Rj0 must have the same degree and thus deg(P j0) ≤ deg(Qj0) < t − ω.
Furthermore, since j0 ∈ L, we have deg(Rj0) < deg(Qj0) + k. Therefore,
both the polynomial
E = P j0 · f −Qj0 · g
and Rj0 have degree strictly smaller than t− ω + k, which is at most ω.
On the other hand,
Rj0 = P j0 · V +Qj0 ·W
= P j0 · χA +Qj0 · χB + E
= χA∩B
(
P j0 ·Q+Qj0 · P
)
+ E
(12)
Since deg(χA∩B) = ω and deg(Rj0),deg(E) < ω, we can conclude from (12)
that P j0 · Q + Qj0 · P = 0. As P and Q are co-prime, this implies that
P j0 = α
′P and Qj0 = −α
′Q. On the other hand, deg(Qj0) ≤ deg(Qjω) =
deg(Q) and, consequently, α′ ∈ F. By definition of L, Rj0 6= 0 and thus, α
′
is non-zero. This proves the statement of Lemma 2.
Consider the following.
Corollary 5. Suppose that ω ≥ (t+ k)/2 and Rj0 = P j0 · V +Qj0 ·W are
as in Step 2 of Algorithm 1. Then
f ≡ V mod Qj0 .
Proof. By Lemma 2 we see that Qj0 divides χA and thus the corollary
follows.
In particular, assuming ω ≥ (t+ k)/2, Algorithm 1 passes the test made
in Step 3 and together with Lemma 2 the desired Statement a) of Theorem
1 follows.
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Proof of b)
To prove Statement b), note that the polynomials P j and Qj in Algorithm
1 must be co-prime; this is a necessary property of the coefficients in the
extended Euclidean algorithm (e.g., see the proof of Lemma 3.8 in [27]).
Consider the following.
Lemma 4. Assume k ≤ s ≤ t and let V ,W ∈ F[X] be of degree t and s,
respectively. Suppose that there exist co-prime polynomials P ∗, Q∗ ∈ F[X]
with Q∗ 6= 0 such that R = P ∗ · V +Q∗ ·W is non-zero with degree smaller
than deg(Q∗) + k; furthermore, assume that fˆ = V rem Q∗ is of degree
smaller than k.4
Then there exist gˆ, χ ∈ F[X ] and a non-zero α ∈ F such that:
1. deg(gˆ) < k;
2. V = fˆ + χ · Qˆ and W = gˆ + χ · Pˆ with Pˆ = α · P ∗ and Qˆ = −α ·Q∗;
3. deg(χ) = t− deg(Q∗).
Proof. From R = P ∗ ·V +Q∗ ·W and deg(R) < deg(Q∗)+ k ≤ deg(Q∗)+ s,
we can conclude deg(P ∗) + t = deg(Q∗) + s and, in particular, deg(P ∗) ≤
deg(Q∗).
Set gˆ = P ∗ · (V − fˆ)/Q∗ + W . Since Q∗ divides V − f , gˆ is a (non-
fractional) polynomial in F[X]. It follows that
P ∗ · fˆ +Q∗ · gˆ = P ∗ · V +Q∗ ·W = R. (13)
Since, by assumption, deg(R) < deg(Q∗) + k, deg(fˆ) < k, and deg(P ∗) ≤
deg(Q∗), we may conclude from (13) that deg(gˆ) < k.
Set V0 = V − fˆ and W0 =W − gˆ. Then
P ∗ · V0 +Q
∗ ·W0 = 0.
Furthermore, since deg(fˆ),deg(gˆ) < k ≤ s ≤ t, V0 andW0 must be of degree
t and s, respectively.
Write χ = gcd(V0,W0), Qˆ = V0/χ, and Pˆ =W0/χ. Note that
0 = P ∗ · V0 +Q
∗ ·W0 = χ · (P
∗ · Qˆ+Q∗ · Pˆ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Since, by construction, Pˆ and Qˆ are co-prime, we may conclude that there
exists a non-zero β ∈ F[X] with P ∗ = β · Pˆ and Q∗ = −β · Qˆ. Since P ∗ and
Q∗ are co-prime, β ∈ F and, hence, setting α = β−1 yields the statement of
the lemma.
4By V rem Q∗ we denote the remainder of V divided by Q∗.
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Now, Statement b) follows as a corollary. More specifically, if Algorithm
1 outputs (ω∗,A0,B0), then there exist polynomials R,P
∗, Q∗ such that
the requirements in Lemma 4 are fulfilled, i.e., the polynomials Rj0 , P j0
and Qj0 such that Q
∗ passes the test made in Step 3 of Algorithm 1. It
follows with the lemma that there exists a polynomial χ ∈ F[X] of degree
ω∗ = t−deg(Q∗) and polynomials fˆ , gˆ ∈ F[X ] of degree smaller than k such
that V = fˆ + χχA0 and W = gˆ + χχB0 .
Proof of c)
In this section, we estimate the running time of the partial recovery attack.
For the running times of the used sub-algorithms, we refer to [27].
Lemma 5. Algorithm 1 can be implemented using an expected number of
O(t2) +O∼(t · log n)
operations in F.
Proof. In Step 1 of the algorithm the sequence in the extended Euclidean
algorithm is computed which consumes O(t2) finite field operations and
which dominates the time needed to compute the remainder in Step 3. If
an index j0 is found in Step 2, the polynomials’ root have to be computed
in Step 4. This can be performed using an expected number of O∼(t ·
log |F|) operations in F (Corollary 14.16 in [27]). Thus, Algorithm 1 can be
implemented using the claimed number of operations in F.
The above lemma states that the partial recovery attack can be imple-
mented to run in non-deterministic polynomial time. It is in fact not known
whether the algorithm can be implemented to run in deterministic polyno-
mial time. The question whether there exists a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm depends on whether there exists a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm for finding the roots of a polynomial in a finite field. For
a variety of special cases, assuming the extended Riemann hypothesis, it is
known that deterministic algorithms factoring polynomials whose running
times are bounded by a polynomial exists. On the other hand, factoring
polynomials can be performed very fast using very efficient randomized al-
gorithms. For a survey as well as further references we refer to [39].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
In order to prove the theorem, we need an estimation for the number of
values that a pair (V ,W ) of vault records can take, so that V and W corre-
spond to (i.e., can be constructed from) feature sets A and B, respectively,
with given set distance dist (A,B) = d. We do this by means of the follow-
ing lemma which limits the number of values for the upper t− k coefficients
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of the vault records, i.e., the number of vault records in the deterministic
version of the improved fuzzy vault.
Lemma 6. For a given deterministic vault record V = (vk, . . . , vt) let U
s
d(V )
denote the set of deterministic vault records W = (wk, . . . , ws) so that V
and W can be constructed from feature sets A and B, respectively, with
dist (A,B) = d. Then for any vault record V = (vk, . . . , vt), s ≤ t and
0 ≤ d ≤ s+ t, the cardinality of Usd(V ) is limited by n
d.
Proof. We first show the result for the case t = s and afterwards generalize
it to arbitrary feature set sizes. Both cases, i.e., t = s and the general case,
are proven by induction.
The case of equal feature set sizes (t = s). Note that the set difference
between sets of equal size is always even. For d = 0, the claim is trivial.
Let A,B be two feature sets of size t with d = dist (A,B) = 2, i.e., A =
(A ∩B) ∪ {a} and B = (A ∩B) ∪ {b}.
Since the vault records V andW are the coefficients of the characteristic
polynomial of A and B, respectively, they can be written as vm = σt−m(A)
and wm = σt−m(B) for m = k, . . . , t, where σm, as defined in (3), denotes
the m-th elementary symmetric polynomial [29].
From the general equation
σm(X1, . . . ,Xn) = X1 · σm−1(X2, . . . ,Xn) + σm(X2, . . . ,Xn)
follows that vm − wm = (a − b) · σt−m−1(A ∩ B) and by recursively using
σr(A ∩ B) = σr(A) − a · σr−1(A ∩ B) for r = t −m − 1, . . . , 1 as well as
σ0(A ∩B) = σ0(A) = 1, we obtain
vm − wm = (a− b) ·
t−m∑
i=1
(−a)i−1σt−m−i(A)
= (a− b) ·
t−m∑
i=1
(−a)i−1vm+i
for m = k, . . . , t. Consequently, the elements wk+1, . . . , wt are uniquely
determined by a, b and the vault record V . This proves the result for d = 2
(in the case t = s).
We now estimate
∣∣U td(V )∣∣ for d > 2 and assume that ∣∣U ti(Z)∣∣ ≤ qi holds
for any vault record Z = (zk, . . . , zt) and for all even i < d.
For any pair of feature sets A and B of size t having set difference
dist (A,B) = d, there exists a set D of size t with dist (B,D) = d − 2 and
dist (A,D) = 2. Thus,
U td(V ) ⊆
⋃
D∈Ut
2
(V )
U td−2(D).
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Therefore, by applying the induction assumption for i = 2 and i = d−2, we
obtain
∣∣U td(V )∣∣ ≤ ∑
D∈Ut
2
(V )
∣∣U td−2(D)∣∣
≤
∑
D∈Ut
2
(V )
nd−2
≤ nd.
The case of unequal feature set sizes (t > s). Let d = 1, i.e., let A,B
be two feature sets of size t and t−1, respectively, with d = dist (A,B) = 1,
i.e., A = B ∪ {a}. From Lemma 1, we see that
wm =
t∑
i=m+1
ai−m−1vi.
for m = k, . . . , t − 1. Thus, W is uniquely determined by V and a, which
proves the result for d = 1.
We now estimate |Usd(V )| for d > 1 and s < t. By induction assumption,
we can assume that |Usi (D)| ≤ n
i holds for any vault record D = (ck, . . . , cn)
with s < n ≤ t and all i < d.
Analogously to the case for equal feature set sizes, we argue that for
given feature set A of size t, all feature sets B of size s ≤ t having set
difference dist (A,B) = d can be reached by enumerating all sets B of size
s with dist (B,D) = d − 1 for all sets D of size t− 1 with dist (A,D) = 1.
Thus, we get
|Usd(V )| =
∑
Z∈Ut−1
1
(V )
∣∣Usd−1(Z)∣∣ .
Since the vault records Z in the sum above are of degree t − 1, i.e., are
computed from feature sets of size t−1, we have to distinguish two cases. If
s < t− 1, we get
∣∣Usd−1(Z)∣∣ ≤ qd−1 by induction assumption. On the other
hand, if s = t− 1, we get the same bound from the result for equal feature
set sizes (see first part of the proof). Thus, in any case, we obtain
|Usd(V )| ≤
∑
Z∈Ut−1
1
(V )
nd−1,
≤ nd.
Using Lemma 6, can now prove Theorem 3.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Considering the secure sketch (see [14] for a definition)
that takes as input (A,B) and outputs the corresponding vaults V and W
as secure sketch (SS) we can apply Lemma 2.2 (b) in [14] to obtain
H˜∞(A,B|V ,W ) ≥ H∞(A,B, V ,W )− λ,
where 2λ is the number of values the output (V ,W ) can take, i.e., the
number of pairs of vaults that can be generated from feature sets A and B
with set difference d.
In the case of the deterministic version of the improved fuzzy vault, V
and W contain t− k and s− k elements, respectively, so that λ ≤ (t+ s −
2k) log n. On the other hand, W ∈ Usd(V ) and, hence, from Lemma 6 we
get λ ≤ (t− k+ d) log n. Furthermore, since no randomness is added to the
deterministic vaults, we have H∞(A,B, V ,W ) = H∞(A,B). This gives the
desired result.
In the case of the probabilistic version of the fuzzy vault, 2k log n bits of
entropy are added to H∞(A,B, V ,W ) by the random polynomials, but this
additional term cancels out with the increase of λ by 2k log n introduced by
the 2k additional coefficients v0, . . . , vk−1, w0, . . . , wk−1 in the output (V ,W )
of the secure sketch.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
In our proof, we distinguish three cases: (t+ k)/2 > ω ≥ t− k, ω = k, and
ω < k.
Assume that A is an algorithm that takes as input two vault records V
andW of feature setsA and B of size t and s, respectively, with |A∩B| = ω,
and outputs an element a from the set difference (A ∪ B) \ (A ∩ B) with
probability pA. We will use A to construct a full recover attack B on (V ,W )
that outputs (A,B), and using Theorem 3, we will derive a bound on the
success probability pA of A.
Since the feature sets A and B are chosen uniformly at random, we have
H∞(A,B) =
(
n
t+s−ω
)
.
Proof for the case (t+ k)/2 > ω ≥ t− k. Algorithm B works as follows. Note,
that since (t+ k)/2 > ω, we have h ≥ 1.
1. Invoke algorithm A with input (A,B) to obtain an output a0 ∈ (A ∪
B) \ (A ∩B).
2. Randomly choose a bit x ∈ {0, 1}. If x = 0, assume a0 ∈ A \ B
and proceed with the subsequent steps as described below. If x = 1,
assume a0 ∈ B\A and proceed with the subsequent steps with A and
B exchanged (and t and s exchanged likewise).
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3. Guess h−1 elements a1, . . . , ah−1 from A\B and use (7) to iteratively
compute the coefficients (v¯k−h, . . . , v¯t−h) of the characteristic polyno-
mial χ
A¯
of A¯ = A \ {a0, . . . , ah−1} from the coefficients vk, . . . , vt of
V .
4. Guess h elements b0, . . . , bh−1 from B \ A and use (7) to iteratively
compute the coefficients (w¯k−h, . . . , w¯s−h) of the characteristic poly-
nomial χ
B¯
of B¯ = B \ {b0, . . . , bh−1} from the coefficients wk, . . . , ws
of W .
5. Invoke the partial recovery attack (Algorithm 1) with parameters t¯ =
t− h, s¯ = s− h and k¯ = k − h on input (v¯k¯, . . . , v¯ t¯) and (w¯k¯, . . . , w¯s¯).
If the partial recovery attack returns Failure, do so as well and stop;
otherwise assume that the output (ω∗, A¯0, B¯0) satisfies A¯0 = A¯ \ B¯
and B¯0 = B¯ \ A¯ and continue.
6. Guess m = k − t+ ω many elements ah, . . . , ah+m−1 from A ∩B.
7. Unlock A: compute the unique polynomial f∗ of degree smaller than
k interpolating the pairs (a, V (a)) for all a ∈ {a0, . . . , ah+m−1} ∪ A¯0.
If V −f∗ splits into distinct linear factors, set A as the set of its roots;
otherwise return Failure.
8. Set B = B0 ∪ (A \A0). Output (A,B).
Assume that A has been successful and that the guess of B on whether
a0 ∈ A \B or a0 ∈ B \A was correct; this occurs with probability pA/2.
If a ∈ A\B, the probability pGuess1 that a1, . . . , ah−1 and b0, . . . , bh−1 are
indeed elements of A \B and B \A, respectively, is lower bounded by
pGuess1 ≥
(
t− ω
h− 1
)(
s− ω
h
)(
n
2h− 1
)−1
.
In the alternative case a ∈ B\A, B guesses h elements from A\B and h−1
elements from B \A, but since t ≥ s, the lower bound (A.3) for pGuess1 still
holds.
Assuming that all ai and bj are elements ofA\B and B\A, respectively,
input to the partial recovery attack are two vault records of the feature sets
A¯ and B¯ of size t¯ and s¯, respectively, with the secret polynomials f¯ and g¯
having degree k¯ = k − h. Furthermore, if a ∈ A \ B, we have t¯ ≥ s¯ and
|A¯∩ B¯| = ω = (¯t+ k¯)/2. In the other case, i.e., if a ∈ B \A, we have s¯ ≥ t¯
and |A¯∩ B¯| = ω = (s¯+ k¯)/2. Thus, in both cases, the output of the partial
recovery attack satisfies A¯0 = A¯ \ B¯ and B¯0 = B¯ \ A¯.
At this point, if all steps have been successful, algorithm B has learned
all t − ω elements of A \ B. Therefore, after guessing m many elements
from A ∩ B, the unlocking procedure uncovers A, which also reveals B.
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(Since ω ≥ t − k, we have m ≥ 0.) The guessing succeeds with probability
pGuess2 ≥
(
ω
k−t+ω
)(
n
k−t+ω
)−1
.
Overall, the success probability pB of algorithm B is at least
pB ≥ (pA/2) · pGuess1 · pGuess2
> (pA/2)
(
t−ω
h−1
)(
s−ω
h
)(
ω
k−t+ω
)
(
n
2h−1
)(
n
k−t+ω
) . (14)
On the other hand, Theorem 3 gives
pB ≤ n
t+s−2k
(
n
t+ s− ω
)−1
. (15)
Combining the inequalities (14) and (15) yields
p ≤
2nt+s−2k
(
n
2h−1
)(
n
k−t+ω
)
(
t−ω
h−1
)(
s−ω
h
)(
ω
k−s+ω
)(
n
t+s−ω
)
where h = (t+ k)/2− ω. This completes the proof for the case (t+ k)/2 >
ω ≥ t− k
We now turn to the second case.
Proof for the case ω = k. Algorithm B works as follows.
1. Invoke algorithm A with input (A,B) to obtain an output a0 ∈ (A ∪
B) \ (A ∩B).
2. Randomly choose a bit x ∈ {0, 1}. If x = 0, assume a0 ∈ A \ B
and proceed with the subsequent steps as described below. If x = 1,
assume a0 ∈ B\A and proceed with the subsequent steps with A and
B exchanged (and t and s exchanged likewise).
3. Guess k − 1 many further elements {a1, . . . ak−1} from A.
4. Unlock A: compute the unique polynomial f∗ of degree smaller than
k interpolating the pairs (a, V (a)) for all a ∈ {a0, . . . ak−1}. If V − f
∗
splits into distinct linear factors, set A as the set of its roots; otherwise
return Failure.
5. Guess A ∩B by randomly choosing a k-element subset of A \ {a0}.
6. Unlock B: compute the unique polynomial g∗ of degree smaller than k
interpolating the pairs (a,W (a)) for all a ∈ A∩B. IfW−g∗ splits into
distinct linear factors, set B as the set of its roots; otherwise return
Failure.
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7. Output (A,B).
Obviously, if A is successful and all guesses are correct, B succeeds as
well.
The probability that A is successful and that B guesses correctly whether
a0 ∈ A\B or a0 ∈ B\A is pA/2. Furthermore, the k−1 additional elements
of A are guessed with probability
(
t−1
k−1
)
/
(
n−1
k−1
)
. Finally, guessing A ∩B as
a k-element subset of A \ {a0} succeeds with probability
(
t−1
k
)−1
. Overall,
this results in the following lower bound for the success probability pB of B.
pB ≥ (pA/2)
k(
n
k−1
)
(t− k + 1)
On the other hand, Theorem 3 gives an upper bound of
pB ≤ n
t+s−2k
(
n
t+ s− k
)−1
.
Combining upper and lower bounds, we obtain
pA ≤
2nt+s−2k
(
n
k−1
)
(t− k + 1)(
n
t+s−k
)
k
.
This completes the proof for the case ω = k.
We now turn to the last case.
Proof for the case ω < k. Algorithm B works as follows.
1. Invoke algorithm A with input (A,B) to obtain an output a0 ∈ (A ∪
B) \ (A ∩B).
2. Randomly choose a bit x ∈ {0, 1}. If x = 0, assume a0 ∈ A \ B
and proceed with the subsequent steps as described below. If x = 1,
assume a0 ∈ B\A and proceed with the subsequent steps with A and
B exchanged (and t and s exchanged likewise).
3. Guess all ω elements from A ∩B.
4. Guess k−ω−1 many additional elements {a1, . . . ak−ω−1} from A\B,
and k − ω many elements {b1, . . . bk−ω} from B \A.
5. Unlock A: compute the unique polynomial f∗ of degree smaller than k
interpolating the pairs (a, V (a)) for all a ∈ (A∩B)∪{a0, . . . ak−ω−1}.
If V −f∗ splits into distinct linear factors, set A as the set of its roots;
otherwise return Failure.
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6. Unlock B: compute the unique polynomial g∗ of degree smaller than
k interpolating the pairs (b,W (b)) for all b ∈ (A ∩B) ∪ {b1, . . . bk−ω}.
IfW −g∗ splits into distinct linear factors, set B as the set of its roots;
otherwise return Failure.
7. Output (A,B).
Obviously, if A is successful and all guesses are correct, B succeeds as
well.
The probability that A is successful and that B guesses correctly whether
a0 ∈ A \ B or a0 ∈ B \ A is pA/2. Furthermore, A ∩ B is guessed with
probability at least
(
n
ω
)−1
. Finally, the k − ω − 1 elements of A and the
k − ω elements of B are guessed with probability at least
(
t−ω−1
k−ω−1
)
/
(
n
k−ω−1
)
and
(
s−ω
k−ω
)
/
(
n
k−ω
)
, respectively.
Overall, this results in the following lower bound for the success proba-
bility pB of B.
pB ≥ (pA/2)
(
t−ω−1
k−ω−1
)(
s−ω
k−ω
)
(
n
ω
)(
n
k−ω−1
)(
n
k−ω
)
On the other hand, Theorem 3 gives an upper bound of
pB ≤ n
t+s−2k
(
n
t+ s− ω
)−1
.
Combining upper and lower bounds, we obtain
pA ≤
2nt+s−2k
(
n
ω
)(
n
k−ω−1
)(
n
k−ω
)
(
n
t+s−ω
)(
t−ω−1
k−ω−1
)(
s−ω
k−ω
) .
This completes the proof for the case ω < k.
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